



The Opinions of AG Bobek in the EMA relocation and
ELA location cases
Citation for published version (APA):
Chamon, M. (2021). The Opinions of AG Bobek in the EMA relocation and ELA location cases. EU Law
Live , 1-6.
Document status and date:
Published: 11/10/2021
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.




Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.










“The Opinions of AG Bobek in the EMA relocation 













Suggested citation: Merijn Chamon, “The Opinions of AG Bobek in the EMA relocation and ELA location cases”, EU 












“The Opinions of AG Bobek in the EMA relocation 







On 6 October, Advocate General (AG) Bobek 
adopted two (1, 2) Opinions in five (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
cases that have been brought against the Council 
(and the Parliament) by the Parliament, Italy and 
the city of Milan. There is one very simple and 
straightforward question underlying all these 
cases: Who decides where an EU agency should 
be located? The different (political land legal) 
constellations in which this question is put to the 
Court result in unseen levels of sophism being 
reached in the observations submitted to the 
Court. As the AG notes in (para.125) of one of his 
Opinions: 
Upon initial inspection, a number of the 
arguments raised by the parties in the present 
cases are simply baffling, amounting to nothing 
less than advanced legal acrobatics. A Member 
State and a local entity are seeking to protect the 
prerogatives of the European Parliament in a 
specific case, apparently against the will of that 
very Parliament, while in parallel proceedings 
that latter body insists on upholding those same 
prerogatives. A Member State is alleging that the 
Member States do not have the competence to 
take a decision on the seats of agencies, but was 
previously and apparently subsequently willing to 
participate in those exact selection procedures. 
As for the Council, it posits that the decision of 
the representatives of the Member States on the 
seat of an EU agency adopted pursuant to Article 
341 TFEU is binding on everyone, without 
anybody actually being subsequently limited in 
their legislative powers, in particular, with 
regard to where exactly that issue ought to be 
settled. 
To ensure this Op-Ed remains readable, it will not 
get drawn into the detailed submissions by the 
parties. This Op-Ed first makes a distinction 
between the cases (1, 2, 3) challenging the 
‘intergovernmental seat decisions’ and the cases 
(4, 5) challenging the ‘EMA relocation 




there is the Parliament, Italy and Milan asking for 
the annulment of decisions taken by the Member 
States on the seat of the European Medicines 
Agency (EMA) and of the European Labour 
Authority (ELA). In the ‘EMA relocation 
regulation’ cases, Italy and Milan ask for the 
annulment of the Regulation of the Parliament 
and Council amending the EMA regulation to the 
effect that EMA’s seat is defined as being in 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
 
Some background 
The EMA and ELA are EU decentralised 
agencies. While there is no official definition of 
these bodies, they can be qualified as permanent 
bodies under EU public law established by the 
EU institutions under secondary legislation and 
endowed with their own legal personality. EU 
agencies are typically established by the EU 
legislature, in the past by the Council alone and 
now generally by Council and Parliament through 
the ordinary legislative procedure. Politically, 
whenever a new agency is established, it is seen 
by the Member States as an appealing trophy to 
host on their territories. In the past this has 
resulted in protracted horse trading on who gets 
to host a newly established agency, not seldomly 
with suboptimal outcomes for the agency 
concerned. Indeed, the priority for the Member 
State that ultimately clinches the trophy was often 
not the proper functioning of the new EU agency 
but instead increasing the prestige or appeal of the 
city designated to host the agency.  In this regard, 
the 2009 Ramboll report noted that six EU 
agencies had significant or major remoteness 
problems and the same critique has been a 
recurring feature in the European Parliament’s 
yearly budgetary discharge resolutions 
since 2012. 
The EU institutions also recognized this problem 
in their 2012 Common Approach on EU 
Decentralized Agencies since the Common 
Approach defines a set of non-binding criteria to 
be met by the city that hosts an agency. The 
Common Approach equally notes that it did not 
call into question that ‘the political decision on an 
agency’s seat [is] taken by common agreement 
between the representatives of the Member States 
meeting at Head of State or government level or 
by the Council’. Still, since 2012 a rationalization 
of the way in which the host city is selected may 
be seen: Member States are asked to submit bids 
which the Commission evaluates and upon which 
a collective decision is then made. In 
2017 Tovo therefore found that this new 
rationalized process amounts to a partial 
‘communitarisation’ of this decision-making. It 
should thus be possible to prevent any new 
agency from ending up in places like 
Valenciennes or Heraklion (on the evolving 
decision-making, see also here). 
The issue remains however that the Member 
States seem to believe that the choice on the seat 
of an agency established by the EU legislature is 
to be made by the Member States, not by the EU 
legislature itself or any EU institution for that 
matter. Evidently, the European Parliament does 
not agree and criticizing the Common Approach 
on this point, believes that the Member States 
could not have decided on the seat of the ELA as 
they did. Italy and Milan for their part are 
unhappy that Milan lost against Amsterdam in its 
bid to host the EMA and therefore challenge both 




the subsequent legislative regulation that 
amended the EMA regulation. Before the AG 
could address the key issue of who gets to decide 
on an agency’s seat he had to deal with the 
admissibility of the different cases. 
 
Admissibility 
The five cases present two glaring admissibility 
issues: can a legal person like the city of Milan 
bring an admissible action against a legislative 
regulation? Can collective decisions of the 
Member States be challenged under Article 263 
TFEU? 
The AG proposes to find Milan’s action in the 
‘EMA relocation regulation’ case admissible, 
since Milan is directly and individually 
concerned by it. In a nutshell, the AG arrives at 
this conclusion by comparing Milan’s situation as 
that of the unsuccessful competitor of a winning 
bid in a public procurement procedure: Milan is 
directly concerned because the decision to assign 
the EMA to Amsterdam meant it could not be 
assigned to Milan. Milan would also be 
individually concerned, i.e. because it was one of 
the candidate cities that made it to the final rounds 
of the selection process. For both direct and 
individual concern, the AG stresses that account 
should be taken of the factual circumstances 
(paras 94 & 110-111), but this simultaneously 
stresses the vulnerability of the AG’s proposed 
solution. Under established case law (e.g. para. 
27), being part of a closed group is not sufficient 
to show individual concern in relation to an act of 
general application like the regulation at issue. 
While a decision to award a contract to a 
competitor is of an individual nature for which it 
is sufficient to show one is member of a closed 
group, the decision of the EU legislature on the 
location of one of the bodies of the EU is arguably 
different, even if a competitive process not unlike 
a public procurement procedure has preceded that 
decision. Indeed, the restrictive effect of 
the Plaumann doctrine results precisely from the 
fact that it boils down to a non-factual 
assessment. Otherwise Jego-Quéré would still be 
happily fishing in ICES sub-area VII. The Court 
of Justice might therefore well rule that Milan’s 
action against the regulation is inadmissible. 
The second admissibility issue, in the 
‘intergovernmental seat decisions’ cases gives 
even more food for thought. Can a collective 
decision of the Member States be challenged 
pursuant to an action for annulment? The obvious 
answer clearly is ‘no’, since only the acts of EU 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies may be 
reviewed by the EU Courts. However, in the past 
the Courts exceptionally do ‘requalify’ the author 
of a contested act to bring it within or outside the 
scope of Article 263 TFEU. Should we requalify 
the author of the contested decisions on the seat 
of the EMA and ELA through inverse reasoning 
based on the question who should have adopted 
these decisions rather than who did adopt these 
decisions? The AG proposes not to embark on 
such a perilous journey and proposes to just take 
the decisions at face value: they were adopted by 
the Member States acting jointly and are therefore 
decisions of the Member States, not of the 
Council (paragraph 81). The possibility to 
requalify should be limited, according to the AG, 
to situations where a procedure under EU law has 
initially been followed which undoubtedly should 
have resulted in an EU decision but which for 




decision adopted outside the Treaty framework 
(paragraph 80). Since that is not the case here, the 
AG finds the action inadmissible. 
Sticking to the purpose of the action for 
annulment, this is where the analysis of the AG in 
the ‘intergovernmental seat decisions’ ought to 
have ended. However, this would not have 
allowed the key issue underlying the controversy 
to be settled and as the AG noted all the 
institutional parties concerned would like to see 
the Court settle this issue (fn. 104). The AG thus 
goes on to determine whether Article 341 TFEU, 
which states that ‘The seat of the institutions of 
the Union shall be determined by common accord 
of the governments of the Member States’, 
applies also to the seat of EU agencies as argued 
by the Council. While this is no critique on the 
elaborate analysis of the AG, it should be clear 
that the finding on this question cannot change 
the finding of inadmissibility anymore: regardless 
of whether Article 341 TFEU is applicable or not, 
the AG already found that the contested decision 
is one of the Member States and therefore not 
challengeable pursuant to Article 263 TFEU. For 
the remainder, the action for annulment thus de 
facto serves the purpose of an infringement action 
under Article 258 TFEU: if Article 341 TFEU 
does not apply to the choice on the seat of the 
agencies, the Member States have infringed the 
Treaties by arrogating this power to themselves. 
 
The scope of Article 341 TFEU 
Following a textual (paras 91-92) and systemic 
(paras 93-108) (but not teleological, see below) 
reading of Article 341 TFEU the AG rejects the 
Council’s reading of that Article to the effect that 
it would also apply to the seat of EU agencies. 
The AG does not make short shrift of the 
Council’s argument that past practice indicates 
that the seat of EU agencies should indeed be 
decided by the Member States (paras 109-127). 
Rather than simply noting that in any event (past) 
practice cannot override the Treaties (para. 127), 
the AG notes that past practice has not been 
consistent (para. 121) and that Protocol No 6 
which refers to Article 341 TFEU and which was 
annexed to the TEU and TFEU by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam only incorporates a part of the 
Edinburg Decision and only refers to one EU 
agency, namely Europol (para. 112). The AG 
could also have noted here that at the time (Treaty 
of Amsterdam), Europol was still a fully fledged 
international organisation and not an EU agency. 
Countering the argument that Article 341 TFEU 
would have exhausted its useful purpose if it 
would only relate to the institutions in the strict 
sense, the AG makes a remarkable case against 
the purposeful reading of the EU Treaties (para. 
137) and rightly notes that even a strict reading of 
Article 341 TFEU would still be of use, since the 
Member States might still want to change the seat 
of an institution in the future (para. 138). 
As noted above, the AG’s finding on the 
applicability of Article 341 TFEU only served to 
confirm that the Member States acted in 
contravention of the Treaties. While their 
decision may have legal effect between 
themselves, this is only so outside the EU legal 
order (paras 144-164). Within the EU legal order, 
their decision has no legal effects and does not 
bind the Council or Parliament. The seat of an EU 
agency should thus be determined by the EU 





Paradoxically, if the Court follows the AG’s lead 
the Parliament will win its case although its 
action is found inadmissible. This follows from 
the peculiar constellation resulting from the 
Parliament’s prerogatives being threatened by 
intergovernmental decision-making between the 
Member States. It is the same reason why an 
argument has been made (in vain) for the 
Parliament to challenge the European Council 
conclusions of December 2020 in which the 
heads of state and government de facto amended 
the draft legislative act of the Parliament and 
Council on the Rule of Law mechanism. AG 
Bobek’s reasoning in the present cases shows that 
the Parliament could also have bolstered its 
prerogatives vis-à-vis the European Council even 
if the Court had found such an action 
inadmissible. A clear judicial confirmation that 
the European Council’s amendments to a draft 
legislative act are legally non-existent would 
indeed strengthen the position of the Parliament 
for the future, just like AG Bobek’s Opinion will 
do next time the seat of a new EU agency needs 
to be decided upon. 
 
The EU legislature’s prerogative to decide on 
an EU agency’s seat 
Finally, this brings us back to the ‘EMA 
relocation regulation’ cases. Even if the case 
brought by the city of Milan would be 
inadmissible, the case brought by Italy will (also) 
allow the Court to deal (at least implicitly) with 
the key issue underlying all five cases. 
A first argument raised by Italy and Milan is that 
the prerogatives of the Parliament were not 
respected in the adoption of the new EMA 
regulation since the Parliament was relegated to 
rubberstamping the intergovernmental decision 
of the Member States. Without stating so 
explicitly, the reasoning of the AG assumes that 
it is ultimately for the EU legislature to decide on 
the seats of the EU agencies which it establishes. 
Even if the Member States come to a political 
agreement between themselves outside the 
framework of the Treaties, it is still for the 
legislature (which typically includes the 
Parliament) to take the formal decision on the 
seat. The AG thus soundly refutes the argument 
by Italy and Milan, noting that since the 
intergovernmental decision had no legal effect 
whatsoever in the EU legal order (see above), the 
Parliament could fully play its role in the ordinary 
legislative procedure (paras 128-152). As to the 
argument that the regulation is invalid because it 
followed from an invalid decision of the Member 
States, the AG reiterates again that such an 
intergovernmental decision could not be based on 
Article 341 TFEU and ‘has no binding legal 
effects within the EU legal order’ (para. 156). 
 
Looking to the future 
If the Court follows the AG’s lead, it will put an 
end to the misconception that the decision on the 
seat of an EU agency is one for the Member States 
to make (regardless whether pursuant to Article 
341 TFEU or not). EU agencies are established 
by the EU legislature, and it is for the EU 
legislature to determine their seat. Building on the 
improvements in the selection process for the 
seats of EU agencies since 2012 (see above), such 
judgments should result in a further 
rationalization of the selection process. As the 




on the ‘EMA relocation regulation’: when the 
Court confirms that the decision on the seat of an 
EU agency comes under EU competence, and 
more specifically that of the EU legislature, it 
would be appropriate to redesign the selection 
procedure. Such a redesigned procedure would 
fully involve the European Parliament and put it 
on par with the Council. Following an assessment 
of bids submitted by interested Member States it 
would be up to the Member States in Council to 
decide together with the Parliament on the 
location for the seat. The ‘communitarisation’ in 
the selection process would then be finally fully 
achieved. 
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